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Abstract  
This essay advances a deflationary interpretation of populism, Donald Trump and the United 
States Constitution. It accepts that Trump utilises a populist pose but rejects populism as too 
reductive for understanding his ascension and constitutional challenge. First, it argues that 
although he merits the designation, Trump reveals more about populism than populism does 
about him. Trump illustrates populism’s conceptual elasticity but employing it as a frame to 
understand him imposes coherence upon a figure whose monetised politics are chaotic, 
shallow and unanchored by principle. Second, populism provides a necessary but insufficient 
condition for critically explaining Trump’s ascension, either in terms of electoral populism or 
populism in power. Third, while democratic deconsolidation under Trump’s presidency 
cannot be discounted, the Constitution remains resilient in most important respects. A 
dispassionate constitutional sociology counsels a deflationary understanding rather than an 
uncritical alarmism that too frequently reproduces and reinforces the darker aspects of 
Trump’s populist political logic.  
Keywords: populism; Donald Trump; conservatism; Constitution; presidency. 
 
Introduction 
On 20 January 2017, Donald J. Trump swore to ‘preserve, protect, and defend the 
Constitution of the United States’ to become its 45th president. Trepidation at 
despotism and national peril featured prominently in reactions to Trump’s 
ascension: ‘an existential moment’ posing ‘a genuine threat to the well-being of our 
country and the sustainability of our democracy’ (Mann, 2016); a ‘dangerous threat 
to human rights’ (Ross, 2017); and confirmation that the ‘…Constitution is gravely, 
perhaps terminally, ill. Trumpism is the symptom, not the cause, of the malaise’ 
(Epps, 2016). Echoing Plato’s Republic, Andrew Sullivan (2016) lamented Americans 
having ‘jumped off a constitutional cliff’: 
A country designed to resist tyranny has now embraced it. A constitution 
designed to prevent democracy taking over everything has now succumbed to 
it. A country once defined by self-government has openly, clearly, 
enthusiastically delivered its fate into the hands of one man to do as he sees 
fit. After 240 years, an idea that once inspired the world has finally repealed 
itself. We the people did it. 
Disquiet was understandable. As Henry Kissinger noted with diplomatic tact, 
Trump ‘… is a personality for whom there is no precedent in modern American  
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history. And his campaign included rhetorical elements challenging patterns 
heretofore considered traditional’ (Hains, 2016).  Trump’s insurgency upended 
conventional wisdoms but, as Sullivan’s contradictory elegy attested - ‘democracy’ 
‘taking over everything’ under ‘one man’ - a false dichotomy juxtaposes a ‘populist’ 
Trump against a ‘liberal’ Constitution. As Muller (2016, p. 101) argues, populism is 
‘neither the authentic part of modern democratic politics nor a kind of pathology 
caused by irrational citizens. It is the permanent shadow of representative politics.’ 
Trump’s presidency suggests the shadow is doing the casting but, as a latent element 
periodically made manifest, populism represents an endemic presence within 
democratic space. US democracy, with formal equality co-existing alongside massive 
material and social inequality, is especially vulnerable to populist temptations. The 
Founders would recognise the seductive power of a dilettante digital demagogue but 
the failure of their design to prevent Trump’s rise does not imply its inability to 
contain a disruptive presidency.  
To advance this ‘deflationary’ interpretation, I make three arguments. 
First, populism’s conceptual basis is sufficiently elastic to include Trump, but 
Trump confirms more about populism than populism reveals about him. Less the 
prototypical populist than one version of a kaleidoscopic disposition, Trump 
illustrates its capacious adaptability and thinly fluid normative content that functions 
as an artefact of whatever ideological prefix is attached. But understanding him 
requires separating the singular signal from the raucous populist noise. It is a ‘post-
truth’ universally acknowledged that the media took Trump literally but not seriously 
while his supporters did the obverse. But overcompensating by reproducing his every 
Tweet, over-theorising his bluster and treating Trumpism as ‘post-ideological,’ 
corporate statism or ‘fascism’ – a ‘combination of strong government and strong 
corporations should run the nation and the world’ (Kinsley, 2016) - validates the 
artifice of his ‘authenticity,’ imposing coherence upon constant improvisation.  
 Second, populism is a necessary but insufficient condition for critically 
engaging Trump, in terms both of populism in elections and in power. Structural 
accounts exaggerating Trump’s significance as vanguard of a transnational 
awakening misinterpret surface similarities and temporal coincidences for more 
contingent, agency-centred explanations. 2016 saw no US populist revolution but 
rather a continuing collision of two mutually parasitic phenomena: the irresistible 
force of popular discontent and immovable object of partisan polarisation. Invoking 
populism occludes more synchronistic influences: a Republican Party that rarely 
nominates the most conservative candidate; the Electoral College; and hyper-
partisanship. Moreover, while populism is an attractive electoral tactic, post-WWII 
populism has rarely survived governing encounters (outside Latin America). Trump’s 
is unlikely to be different, not least since conservatism and populism exist in an 
orthogonal tension that governing a deeply polarised US can only exacerbate.  
Third, the constitutional threat of Trump in power is less than meets his 
ubiquitous ‘I.’ Democratic deconsolidation cannot be discounted. The presidency has 
acquired power that the Framers never intended and would likely disapprove as 
doing violence to limited government. That accretion has been bipartisan but the 
presidency has never been occupied by a comparably demagogic and potentially 
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corrupt figure, with minimal policy grasp and disdain for institutions, elemental 
facts, Enlightenment values and the democratic disposition.  
However, while constitutionally sanctioned illiberalism is hardly alien to 
America, qualified optimism about the resilient constitutional order remains 
appropriate. Through referenda, initiatives and recalls, populist scepticism about 
representative institutions and an impetus to localise power among the people has 
long informed American constitutionalism. Moreover, the typical governing 
strategems of populists in power – state colonisation, mass clientelism and 
systematic repression – confront powerful obstacles. Liberal values and institutions 
– a co-equal legislature, independent judiciary and free press – would need to 
acquiesce or collapse for a genuinely populist presidency to succeed. Though not 
inconceivable, such a reading privileges executive power over continuities in 
constitutional authority and accountability. 
Ultimately, extra-constitutional influences condition how fully the 
Constitution exposes Trumpism as the pure monetisation of political ambition. 
Although a politics of nostalgia suggests otherwise, neither a constitutional nor US 
‘golden age’ existed. But in a formally Madisonian system featuring an empowered 
but imperfectly legitimated executive, political checks exert greater force than 
legalism. Unless Trump governs in consensual ways that eluded his recent 
predecessors, his populist credentials face evisceration amid the heterodox positions 
in which the administration and Congress cooperate and compete. If a liberal state is 
representative democracy constrained by the rule of law, populism challenges both. 
But among liberal democracies under populist pressure, a comparatively robust 
constitutional order counsels a deflationary understanding: that Trumpism is 
unlikely to survive the reality checks and balances rendering it more political tremor 
than earthquake.  
 
‘I alone can fix it’: Vulgar Populism in the People’s House 
Trump’s populist triumph was the greatest in US history. The celebrity tycoon, 
nominated by the party of Lincoln over sixteen established Republicans, won election 
against a Democratic Party candidate widely considered the most ‘well-qualified’ to 
run for the presidency in decades. Post-election, Trump confirmed his reliably 
problematic relationship with ‘class’: ‘What amazes a lot of people is that I’m sitting 
in an apartment the like of which nobody’s ever seen ... And yet I represent the 
workers of the world.’ To US workers surprised by his Marxian internationalism, 
Trump affirmed a rare reciprocity: ‘I’m representing them, and they love me and I 
love them’ (Scherer, 2016). 
But is Trump a populist? No definitive verdict is possible until his presidential 
record is fully established, but the construct’s very malleability grants him admission.  
Conventional narratives claim that in the Great Recession’s aftershock, the 
negative consequences of globalisation, de-industrialisation, and demographic 
change caused voters to abandon liberal compacts. In an era of pronounced 
economic inequality when western societies no longer deliver consistently rising 
prosperity, grievance is the outgrowth. Neither inherently anti-capitalist nor anti-
market, populist animus targets ‘chumocracy’ and ‘cronyism’ - those conspiring 
through political and financial power for sectional advantage. Its plasticity 
transcends left-right divides. Eschewing ideology, populists assemble eclectic 
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platforms by articulating grievances allegedly neglected by established politics. 
Rejecting pluralism, populists threaten democracy, subverting the notion of the 
‘people’ to discrete ambitions. More a negative disposition than positive ideology, a 
taxonomy suggests varieties of populism that assume distinct forms accommodating 
national conditions; confirming Tolstoy’s timeless wisdom about unhappy families 
each exhibiting their particular form of unhappiness.  
Lacking a bespoke catechism, populism resists homogenisation, but core 
tendencies remain: moralistic anti-pluralism, Manicheanism and romanticising of 
the crowd. Favouring the people against privileged elites, populists reject specific 
prescriptions for a general framework to assess policies, in terms of assisting 
‘working’ people. But populist logic promises more than an echo chamber of 
oppositional discontent. Offering heterodox forms of populist chic for the un-chic 
masses, positive features emphasising the nation’s integrative properties parallel 
derogatory aspects (ethnic, racial and xenophobic prejudices, reactionary 
intolerance). Judis (2016, p. 15) identifies a bifurcated populism, with ‘dyadic’ leftist 
versions arraying the bottom and middle against the top and ‘triadic’ right-wing 
populisms that look ‘upwards but also down upon an out group.’ However, while a 
positive ‘tolerant’ populist tradition exists (Nugent, 2013), the dyadic and triadic 
cousins increasingly resemble each other in the polarised US family, encompassing 
not only antipathy towards selective elites but also oikophobia (from the Greek oikos, 
for ‘home’) towards their fellow citizens.  
Trump powerfully confirms populism’s conceptual fluidity. From his 
campaign launch on June 16 2015, Trump voiced widely-held anxieties in ways 
previously unseen by a major party candidate. In ‘Trumpworld,’ a malign (‘rigged’) 
nexus of stupid politicians and smart foreign nations account for America no longer 
‘winning.’ Evoking a prelapsarian nationalism (the ‘great’ nation to whose Eden-like 
innocence he would return a grateful people), a binary ‘us-versus-them’ division 
(comprising Wall Street, Washington, the media, Democratic and Republican elites), 
displacing blame for current and historic woes on a continuum ranging from rational 
grievance (NATO allies contributing insufficiently to collective security) to paranoid 
conspiracy (Syrian refugees and Mexican criminals ‘flooding’ the US), Trump touted 
an anti-intellectualism (‘I love the poorly educated!’) and situational ethics that 
boasted unique credentials to govern in the people’s interest (‘I can’t be bought’). His 
monochrome rallies bespoke a strident white nationalism marked by nativism, 
‘othering’ and nostalgic idealising of a less than idyllic past.  
But Trump’s triadic populist noir conformed with and departed from US 
traditions dating back to Andrew Jackson, nemesis of the ‘aristocracy of the few.’ 
Negative national prognoses, animated by moral panic, were especially forceful in the 
1890s. Demanding economic redress of the agricultural depression, the populist 
platform – mostly shorn of nativism - denounced ‘the verge of moral, political, and 
material ruin. Corruption dominates the ballot-box, the Legislatures, the Congress, 
and touches even the ermine of the bench’ (Congressional Quarterly, 1997, p. 59). 
The progressive Populist Party won 8.5 percent of the vote in 1892. Populists united 
with radical Democrats in southern and western states, losing to the Republicans 
with William Jennings Bryan’s defeat in 1896. But from Huey Long and Charles 
Lindbergh through George Wallace to Ross Perot, populists - more nationalist than 
progressive - periodically echoed themes of venal elites ruining virtuous peoples.  
Where Trump departed was five-fold.  
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 First was his unconventional success. No populist after Bryan captured a 
major party nomination. As third party candidates, Wallace won five states’ Electoral 
College votes on his segregationist platform in 1968 and Perot achieved 19 percent of 
the popular vote – but no electoral votes – in 1992. Trump mounted a hostile 
Republican Party takeover and won through a politics of retrenchment and 
resentment that depicted the most rich and powerful nation-state as in self-inflicted 
decline. Populism commonly enlists resentment to projects of national renewal 
aspiring to project power but Trump’s ‘America First’ revivalism relied on a miasma 
of pristine sovereignty, economic nationalism and unilateralism married to a 
dystopian vision. Trump’s ‘overarching worldview is that America is in economic 
decline because other nations are taking advantage of it ... Trump’s frustration is that 
the United States gets little for protecting other countries or securing the global 
order, which he sees as a tradable asset that America can use as a bargaining chip 
with friend and foe alike’ (Wright, 2016). 
Second, Trump made for a singular populist: the opulent ‘outsider’ at the apex 
of intersecting commercial, celebrity and political elites. Many run for Washington 
by running ‘against’ it; no-one had previously campaigned successfully against the 
establishment as one of its most obsessively narcissistic and hucksterish members. 
As he told the Republican National Convention, ‘Nobody knows the system better 
than me, which is why I alone can fix it.’1  
Third, Trump understood the nexus of material and cultural inequalities - job 
losses to automation and outsourcing coinciding with a sense of society disrespecting 
working class occupations - when anomie meets cupidity: rootlessness and 
dysfunction accompany the breakdown of work and family, but the white working 
class reliably resents professionals while admiring the rich. In a personalised politics 
epoch, celebrity, wealth and gaming the system offered sufficient proof that a 
poacher could turn gamekeeper to champion Gemeinschaft (community) against 
Gesellschaft (market society). What David Axelrod said of Obama in 2007 applied to 
Trump: ‘he is his own vision’ (Wallace-Wells, 2007). In different ways, both attracted 
a personal vote and pursued relentlessly self-referential careers, campaigns and 
presidencies, preoccupied as much by their own singularity as their nation’s. 
Fourth, Trump’s campaign was enabled by changing technology. Exploiting 
established media whose business models thrive on ratings and controversy, Trump’s 
deftness on social media that viscerally reflect and reinforce societal atomisation 
targeted Democrats at their supposed strength: identity politics. In the ‘Othering’ of 
Obama’s presidency as illegal, illegitimate and ineffective, Nixonian invocations of a 
‘silent majority’ and abusive references to most demographic groups other than white 
men, Trump constructed for his ‘deplorables’ the illusion of direct access with their 
Duce: Mussolini with a 3am Trump Tower Tweet.  
Fifth, Trumpism’s comparative hollowness was distinctive. Populist figures 
such as Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders espouse conservative nationalist 
convictions with relative consistency. But id, not ideology, drives Trump. Trade 
politics aside, neither core nor consistency exist. Although late in the campaign he 
touted a ‘Contract with the American People’ (recalling 1994’s ‘Contract with 
America’), Trumpism remained unanchored by systematic beliefs, prioritising 
instead a results orientation (relegating his nativism, misogyny, and historic sexual 
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assault as secondary to ‘what matters’). Assertions that Trump is ‘post-ideological’ 
ironically overlap with the decidedly un-populist ‘Third Way’ centrism that Bill 
Clinton and Tony Blair marketed in the 1990s. ‘What works’ is preferable to 
ideological consistency; Trump merely has yet to find his Anthony Giddens. 
Populism and pragmatism inhabit proximate space. For Crabb (1989, p. 57):  
If a political leader is described as pragmatic, this might mean one or more of 
the following: (1) he lacks clear ideological goals; (2) his actions do not appear 
to be guided by adherence to clearly defined moral-ethical principles; (3) he is 
motivated by immediate, here-and-now considerations, as distinct from long-
term goals and strategies; (4) he is ‘opportunistic’ and seeks to achieve the 
maximum benefit or gain from opportunities available to him; (5) he is skilled 
in compromise and gaining agreement among divergent positions; (6) he is 
flexible, capable of learning from experience, and of adapting his position to 
changing realities; (7) he is prudent, judicious, tends to avoid extremist 
solutions and understands that politics is ‘the art of the possible.’ 
 
Regarding Trump, only (7) is problematic. Therein lies Trumpism’s elasticity. 
If no necessary or coherent ideological content informs populism, it lacks political 
valence and can accommodate any ideology while disputing the possibility of 
grounding ideologies on anything firmer than results and expedience: the ‘art of the 
deal.’ Avowedly democratic in championing majoritarianism, Trumpism rejects 
unfavourable outcomes; the quintessential expression of which was Trump’s avowal 
that the electoral process would not be ‘rigged’ provided that he won. 
But Trump secured neither a popular vote majority nor plurality. His amoral 
transactionalism merits the term plebeianism, as in ancient Rome: 
… fighting for the interest of the plebs, ‘the common people,’ is not populism, 
but saying that only the plebs (as opposed to the patrician class, never mind 
the slaves) is the populus Romanus – and that only a particular kind of 
populares properly represents the authentic people - is populism (Muller 
2016, p. 23). 
Trump’s plebeian credentials were fully displayed in revealingly confused 
remarks that ‘the only important thing is the unification of the people – because the 
other people don’t mean anything.’2 The Trumpian idiom, supposedly of the average 
American, silenced ‘others’ - Mexicans, Muslims, media, women – to pledge a 
divisible nation with liberty and justice for some. Moreover, Trump’s personal 
history was the antithesis of someone from whom humane empathy even for the 
chosen volk was a minimally credible animating motivation. The artifice of his 
authenticity and infantilisation of discourse were integral to his appeal. The very 
characteristics attracting obloquy – insults, assaults on ‘politically correct’ taboos, 
genitalia references, violent language – testified to his outspoken credentials as 
credibly effecting ‘change’ to an ossified politics-as-usual. To his base, cosmopolitan 
elites’ moral indignation was merely, as H G Wells termed it, ‘jealousy with a halo.’ 
Populism requires performative elements and ‘reality’ showmanship was inseparable 
from anathematising the condescending cognoscenti, which in turn relied on the 
construct of speaking an accessibly plain language eluding the political class. Trump 
- pugilist avatar of ‘real America’ - articulated a Primal Scream of ‘flyover country’ 
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rage against ‘those who control the levers of power in Washington and for the global 
special interests… who don’t have your good in mind.’3  
Hegel claimed ‘the great man is the man who actualises his age.’ In his 
democratic coarseness, celebrity, and Twitter bond, Trump did precisely that. But 
taking Trump seriously as a consequential figure does not entail regarding him as 
serious in his worldview. For Trumpism to become a programme for governing 
requires a coherence that is absent. Since delivering real and timely economic uplift 
to those suffering from automation is problematic, the identity politics may prove 
more enduring. But it is populism’s accommodation with conservatism – limited 
government, scepticism towards grand designs, anti-statism - that will shape 
Trumpism’s encounter with the Constitution. 
 
Plebeians in the Country Club: Republicans as the Workers’ Party? 
Populism is a necessary but insufficient condition of explaining Trump’s ascension. 
Supporters and opponents cast Trump as the paradigmatic case of transnational 
populism and deep forces more significant than a single individual. Yet only 1 in 4 
Americans voted for him. Substantially more voted against than for him in the 
primaries and general election, when many casting pro-Trump ballots did so to vote 
against Hillary Clinton. Moreover, had Trump’s ambition not propelled him to 
appropriate the Republican Party as his vehicle of choice, where would these deep 
forces have found expression? Admirers championed Trump’s rejecting small-
government conservatism for populism: ‘This is called the Republican Party. It’s not 
called the Conservative Party.’4 But the party is ideologically conservative. 2016 had a 
Rashomon-like quality and, having switched parties seven times, Trump is 
untroubled by principles. But heralding a syncretic conservative populism and the 
Republicans’ implausible osmosis into the ‘Party of Workers’ (Lowry, 2016) misreads 
both.  
Admittedly, of seventeen candidates, only Trump offered a populist appeal 
and more whites without college degrees voted for him than for prior Republicans. 
But Trump eschewed a third party or independent candidacy, which would have 
forfeited the party base. Moreover, the notion of a populist surge cannot explain why 
‘establishment’ Senate Republicans - Charles Grassley (Iowa), Ron Johnson 
(Wisconsin), Rob Portman (Ohio), John McCain (Arizona), Marco Rubio (Florida) - 
some of whom repudiated Trump, won election by greater margins; as did almost all 
House Republicans. Moreover, it is probable that another Republican would also 
have beaten Clinton, by larger margins. Trump referred to a ‘movement’ but this was 
groundless, unless defined as mass merchandising ‘Make America Great Again.’ 
Trump is better understood as brand marketing via opportunistic entryism.  
To gain a presence, populism needs a porous political infrastructure and the 
open US system of primaries and caucuses - like proportional systems and direct 
democracy devices - facilitates populist appeals. (Canada’s relatively closed system, 
by contrast, has yet to succumb, despite religious and ethno-racial tensions.) 
Although defying ‘the party decides’ logic that officeholders and donors determine 
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nominees, Trump reaffirmed that the conservative party rarely nominates the most 
conservative candidate. Republican voters divide into four factions: 
moderate/liberal; somewhat conservative; very conservative evangelicals; and very 
conservative seculars (Olsen and Scalia, 2016). Successful candidates combine 
‘somewhat conservatives’ with others and Trump, a heterodox moderate, cut across 
all four. Despite high negatives, the fragmented field assisted by dissuading rivals 
from frontal attacks on a figure for whom there existed no precedent. (No populist 
ran after Pat Buchanan in 1992 and 1996, though social conservatives – Mike 
Huckabee in 2008, Rick Santorum in 2012 – crafted ‘blue collar’ appeals.) Equally 
notable was the foreign policy dimension: no modern nominee had previously won 
by combining nationalists and non-interventionists while leaving conservative 
internationalists adrift. But much of Trump’s serendipitous appeal was stylistic, for 
conservatives disaffected at how – to them - congressional Republicans had 
accommodated rather than challenged Obama. 
Trump built on Tea Party populism. But the hybrid Tea Party was divided 
between national elites leveraging activist energies to further tax cuts, business 
deregulation, and privatisation of programmes on which many grassroots Tea 
Partiers depended, and the latter (approving of entitlements and veterans’ benefits), 
for whom opposition to ‘big government’ comprised reluctance to pay taxes to help 
undeserving ‘freeloaders’: immigrants, minorities, low income earners, and the 
young (Skocpol and Williamson, 2012). Moreover, although both groups viscerally 
opposed Obama, the Tea Party zenith was brief. Its impact was confined to 
congressional and state races, rather than the presidency – where ‘severely 
conservative’ Mitt Romney prevailed in 2012 – and spurred an establishment 
counter-reaction in 2014-16. Where Trump excelled was articulating the message 
animating middle income grassroots: not that government was too big but certain 
beneficiaries were unentitled (‘Redistribute My Work Ethic!’). Not without 
coincidence, 95 per cent of Trump’s donors were white, 64 per cent were white men 
and 27 per cent of Trump’s money came from millionaires (McElwee, Schaffner and 
Rhodes, 2016). 
The shallow ‘populist insurgency’ was echoed in the general election. Trump 
secured 306 electoral votes to Clinton’s 232. Clinton won the popular vote by 2.8 
million votes, winning 48.2 per cent to 46.1 for Trump. Had 77,000 (less than 1 
percent of) Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin voters switched or abstained, 
Clinton would have won. Between public discontent and partisan polarisation, the 
latter prevailed. 89 per cent of Republicans voted for Trump, 88 per cent of 
Democrats for Clinton (Independents preferred Trump, 46-42). Trump received 
approximately the same vote as Romney in 2012, albeit more efficiently distributed. 
In some states, an increase in white working class rural and urban voters tipped him 
over but Trump received a lower share of the overall white vote (58 to Romney’s 59 
per cent). Higher percentages of Latinos and African Americans voted for him while 
fewer black voters turned out for Clinton than Obama (129,000 fewer in Michigan 
and Wisconsin, more than Trump’s combined margin of victory). Exit polls showed 
18 per cent of voters identified themselves as negative towards both candidates, but 
78 per cent of these voted nonetheless: 49 per cent for Trump and 29 per cent for 
Clinton; voters who disapproved of Trump provided his victory.  
Trump undoubtedly exploited a politics of fear animating partisan conflict but 
this was long in gestation. In 1976, only 27 per cent of Americans lived in ‘landslide 
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counties’ where one candidate won by more than 20 percentage points. By 2016, 60 
per cent did and, for the first time, every Senate race was won by the party that won 
that state’s Electoral College votes. ‘Affectively polarized’ Americans fear the other 
party more than they like their own, not merely disagreeing with but actively 
disliking each other. Trump benefited from this Brechtian desire to dissolve the 
people and elect another and the geographic, informational, behavioural and 
consumer silos inhabited by politically attentive Americans. But the delegitimising 
charge ‘he’s not my president’ originated in the 1990s, not 2016/17.     
  
Trumpism also lacked extensive popular support. Studies documented 
approval of Obama’s job performance and stable public attitudes, even on 
international affairs: 
his views on important issues garner only minority support from the overall 
American public. While they are divided on expanding a wall on the US border 
with Mexico, Americans overall support continued immigration into the 
United States and favour reform to address the large population of 
unauthorized immigrants already in the country. Americans overall think 
globalization is mostly good for the United States, and they see many benefits 
to free trade. And the American public as a whole – including the core 
supporters of Donald Trump – still favours the country’s traditional alliances, 
a shared leadership role for the United States abroad, and the preservation of 
US military superiority (Chicago Council, 2016). 
Perhaps reflecting this, after the election, Trump equivocated over several 
promises and staffed his administration with billionaires favouring the free market, 
deregulation, and privatisation, from whom Wall Street had little to fear. In the 
populist family, Podemos, Syriza and others claim to pursue transformed political 
economies. Trump has no such ambition. If one credits his convictions, Trumpism 
aims at reviving, not remodelling, capitalism to benefit working Americans. 
Plutocratic populism is oxymoronic, but Republican presidents from Eisenhower to 
Bush also intervened in the market to pick ‘winners.’ 
 An alternative reading might posit a ‘bait-and-switch.’ US politics is triply 
‘asymmetric.’ Culturally, the parties constitute distinct organisations, Democrats 
representing a coalition of group interests while Republicans advance an ideological 
cause (Grossman and Hopkins, 2016). Spatially, while both have departed the 
‘centre’ ground, Republicans have moved further to the right than Democrats have 
leftward. Ideologically, although more consistent than 40 years ago, Republicans are 
especially so. The overwhelming majority are conservative in identifying with the 
party, knowing how positions relate, and being more than twice as likely as 
Democrats to cite ideological reasons for endorsement. With greater consistency and 
commitment, the party maintains support even on issues where the Democrats’ 
position is popular, to punch above its weight (Lelkes and Sniderman, 2016). 
This explains why Republicans - favouring reductions - tend to prosper in 
states most reliant on federal spending and why Trump squared a circle defeating 
prior candidates: how to win when the structure of public opinion boasts ‘two 
majorities’, simultaneously endorsing philosophical conservatism (anti-statism) and 
operational progressivism (pro-social welfare programmes). Utilising resentment 
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politics persuaded ‘the forgotten men and women of our country, people who work 
hard but no longer have a voice’ that their grievances were heard. That Trumpism’s 
appeal should threaten fiscal conservatism, include LGBT Americans (whom Trump 
vowed to protect) and attract more evangelical Christian votes than George W. Bush 
bespeaks the absence of an irreducible ideational core (Trende, 2016). ‘What truly 
matters is not which party controls our government but whether our government is 
controlled by the people,’ Trump declared in his 2017 inaugural address. If so, only 
governing can determine whose identity crisis – Trump’s or the Republicans’ – 
proves more fatal to their respective authenticities. 
 
Mr Trump Goes to Washington: It’s Mourning Again in America 
Populists in power employ claims of a unique legitimacy and distinct governing 
strategies to advance the ‘authentic’ people’s interests. In terms of the former, the 
institutionalised presidency offers a powerful base for Trump’s grandiosity. But 
another co-equal expression of popular sovereignty - the most racially diverse 
Congress in history - undercuts his monopoly claim to morally legitimate 
representation. On the latter, although the three practices typifying populists in 
power – state colonisation, mass clientelism, and systematic repression (Muller, 
2016, pp. 44-49) – are conceivable, the Constitution presents major barriers to their 
exercise.  
Trump is a sui generis president but in a polity where no secular text enjoys 
greater authority than the Constitution, piety towards the Founders and fear of 
tyranny form reliable dyads of constitutional discourse. Claims that an ‘imperial 
presidency’ is endangering Madisonian equilibrium, Congress causing ‘gridlock’ and 
the courts usurping democracy punctuate every era. The Constitution established 
elaborate checks and balances to frustrate would-be despots, and norms giving these 
effect, but illiberal outcomes transpired under multiple presidencies. Impropriety is 
frequently in the eye of the beholder and partisan lenses have often enjoined 
equanimity to the erosion of constitutional equipoise. Trump nonetheless animates 
‘tyrannophobia’ on multiple fronts: ignorance interwoven with belief in an exclusive 
legitimacy; an extraordinarily powerful presidency; and a constellation of private 
interests and public positions testing the letter and spirit of the rule of law. A 
measured assessment nonetheless suggests that it is the scope, not nature, of the 
challenge that is distinctive. 
The Constitution admittedly failed its first examination, adding new 
dimensions to claims that the Electoral College is an anachronism. The Framers 
feared that a pure democracy could elect a demagogue, charismatic autocrat, or agent 
of a foreign power. The College was designed to preclude selection of dangerously 
unsuitable candidates. In Federalist 68, Alexander Hamilton claimed, ‘The process 
of election affords a moral certainty that the office of President will never fall to the 
lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite 
qualifications.’ Electors would prevent ‘tumult and disorder’ resulting from 
candidates exploiting ‘talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity.’  
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So much for that.  
At the Democrats’ 2016 national convention, Khizr Khan asked of Trump 
‘Have you even read the US Constitution? I will gladly lend you my copy.’ It is 
doubtful. Trump promised to be the ‘best constitutional president ever,’ defend 
‘Article XII’ – bold, given only seven articles - and proposed an immigration policy of 
‘extreme vetting’ to ensure those ‘… who support bigotry and hatred will not be 
admitted for immigration into our country’ (DeYoung, 2016). But in a second failing, 
the Constitution stipulates only that presidents be 35, born in the US and a citizen; 
wisdom, knowledge and irony are not formal prerequisites. 
Constitutional angst was experiencing a periodic return to intellectual fashion 
prior to alarmism about Trump, which cannot be separated from concerns about the 
massive expansion in the regulatory state over which he presides. For some, 
constitutional malpractice is a bipartisan and co-institutional matter. For others, 
partisan and ideological polarisation have collapsed the ‘centre’ and precluded the 
compromises necessary for effective governing. Still others see sterile polarisation as 
less the cause than symptom of a collapse in trust of public institutions and social 
capital. Whichever applies, recent critiques – It’s Even Worse Than It Looks (Mann 
and Ornstein, 2012), America’s Failing Experiment (Goidel, 2015) – suggest broad 
consensus that the system is ‘broken.’ 
 Yet the ‘sky is falling’ notion that the Constitution is awry features contrasting 
prescriptions, pointing to dual reasons for relative sanguinity about Trumpism.  
One is the ‘post-Madisonian’ argument (Posner and Vermeule, 2010). The 
tripartite federal system reflects a conservative disposition against concentrated 
power: each branch, dedicated to the common good, remains jealous of its own 
power. But the greater complexity of modernity concentrates power in the executive, 
and especially the White House, which is why the rise of executive power has 
transcended partisan changes in control and rarely entertained successful challenge. 
(The only concerted attempt at congressional reassertion – against Nixon - mostly 
failed.) The executive-centred state tends to generate political, cultural and social 
checks on presidential action that substitute for, and are more effective than, the 
carapace of constitutional law.  
By contrast, a second case - in a script Trump might have written - argues for 
a more powerful presidency as the only solution to an outmoded Constitution 
(Howell and Moe, 2016). In this view, a framework that made Congress central vests 
excessive power in a parochial legislature protecting particularistic interests, 
rendering government ill-equipped to remedy the social problems of a complex, post-
industrial nation. The key to effective governance requires forcing Congress and its 
pathologies to the periphery of the law-making process by bringing presidents – 
whose national constituency and legacy driven ambition cause them to seek coherent 
policy solutions - to the decision-making centre. 
Although markedly divergent analyses and prescriptions, read together these 
illustrate a Trump presidency distinguished by familiar dynamics: an executive 
hamstrung by statute, struggling against a bicameral Congress possessing the power 
of the purse but divided between its representative and law-making roles, rarely 
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exercising effective oversight and consistently the most unpopular branch of 
government – but impossible fully or legitimately to circumvent. In a purely 
majoritarian democracy, it is conceivable that Trump’s more authoritarian aspects 
could find expression in law. In America’s separated system, three paths instead 
loom large.  
In the first, Trump governs as a conventional Republican espousing 
conservative orthodoxy with few, albeit important, exceptions, advancing the 
‘southernisation’ of public policy: low wage, de-unionised, deregulatory, weakly 
permissive on civil rights but strongly restrictive on reproductive rights. A second 
sees Trump as a pragmatic centrist, challenging totemic policies of the right 
(entitlement reform, defence spending) and left (combatting climate change, foreign 
aid). The third has Trump channel his plebiscitary populism in a nationalist, 
authoritarian guise, part caudillo/part mobster, using the instruments of presidential 
unilateralism to rule through by-passing Congress and defying the courts. Which 
template emerges is less a matter of formal processes than self-interested actors’ 
political calculations.  
Least troubling, constitutionally, are the first two options. The 115th Congress 
(2017-18) has measures ‘to go,’ drafted since 2010 but impossible to pass into law 
with a Democratic president. A conservative presidency, repudiating Obama policies, 
would pose familiar constitutional challenges. Eliminating federal agencies, 
repealing executive orders and issuing new ones, and selectively weakening 
enforcement of existing laws, while politically contentious, is not per se 
unconstitutional. It would also be politically difficult for Democrats, having 
supported Obama in responding to congressional obstructionism by making maximal 
use of executive authority, to castigate Trump for doing so. Equally, given Republican 
reservations over Trumpism, presidential disdain for GOP panjandrums, and intra-
conservative divisions, shrewd Democrats might drive a maximal wedge between the 
White House and Congress. Such an outcome could deliver more ‘centrist’ outcomes 
while allowing Trump to claim an ‘above politics’ bi- or post-partisan mantle.  
More problematic is the authoritarian path – a recrudescence of the Nixonian 
belief that ‘if the president does it, it’s legal’ - enabled by vastly expanded executive 
power. ‘We, the People’ previously found expression in presidential inclinations to 
identify as ‘I, the People,’ assume prerogative powers and execute un- or extra-
constitutional actions. But these were typically in crisis situations or hidden from 
public view. No president claimed a comparably intimate, reliable and immediate 
(social media) connection with the demos. For once, the bully pulpit merits its 
nomenclature. In terms of leadership, foreign affairs and civil rights, a personalised 
presidency bypassing institutions and norms would prove disturbing in the extreme.  
Although presidents in the legislative arena can rarely ‘lead’ by persuasion, the 
rise of the administrative state has expanded the realm of presidential unilateralism, 
or ‘power without persuasion’, through executive orders, agreements, directives, 
findings, memoranda and more. By temperament, Trump may be inclined more to 
invoke inherent Article II authority and revive theories of a unitary executive than - 
like Obama - to claim aggressive compliance through expansive readings of 
congressional statutes. Although he needs Congress to do ‘big things,’ disavowing 
authority to autonomously determine policy would be out of character – not least 
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since presidents acting first typically determine outcomes, with Congress unwilling 
or unable to take collective action to overrule them and courts, lacking democratic 
legitimacy, disinclined to do so. As Bush and Obama demonstrated, a determined 
White House can resist hostile opposition congressional majorities to advance prized 
goals (the Iraq ‘surge’ of 2007, the Iran nuclear deal of 2015). 
The crucial variable is political. Congress retains constitutional authority to 
rein in wayward presidents but the new era of ‘insecure majorities’ - when both 
parties can feasibly win control – militates against its exercise (Lee, 2016). With 
parties acting as quasi-parliamentary armies in a system not designed for 
parliamentary politics, a ‘new politics of extremism’ is ‘colliding’ with antique order 
(Mann and Ornstein, 2012). A partisan presidency sees half of America perceive an 
enemy rather than opponent in the White House. A partisan Congress more at 
loggerheads than log-rolling, hobbled by intense inter-party rivalry and fractious 
intra-party divisions, sees the absence of bipartisanship empower the fringes. In a 
closely competitive era where three-fifths or two-thirds supermajorities rarely exist, 
lawmakers’ ability to overcome presidential vetoes and check asserted prerogatives is 
curtailed (the 2016 congressional veto override of the Justice Against Sponsors of 
Terrorism Act was the single instance under Obama). Incentives to prioritise partisan 
over institutional loyalty are heightened under unified control of government. 
Of even more concern is foreign policy. Trump inherits a national security 
state of immense power and reach, operating mostly without strong judicial or 
legislative oversight, upon thin legal underpinnings on matters from extra-judicial 
assassinations to domestic and foreign surveillance. What Trump seeks to do will 
partly condition whether he enjoys support for how he does so but a destabilising 
Jacksonian statecraft is eminently feasible since, as Wright (2016) notes: 
the inescapable fact is that American national security policy is a hierarchical 
enterprise. There are some checks and balances, but they are fewer than in the 
domestic space. No one can make the commander in chief do something he 
does not want to do. They can’t make him threaten force or use it to uphold an 
alliance. They cannot make him sign a trade agreement or a treaty. And they 
cannot make him support democracy and human rights around the world. 
Trump’s worldview is to reduce America’s role in the world, and there is no 
foolproof check or balance to that ... The United States has built and led a 
liberal international order for the past 70 years. For the first time, America 
will have a president who rejects that strategy. Trump is not unchallenged, 
and there are few who share his vision. But he is poised to revolutionize US 
foreign policy nevertheless.  
On civil rights, too, Trump’s draconian instincts – especially if ‘black swan’ 
events (financial crisis, terrorism) encourage a ‘strong’ response - raise profound 
constitutional problems. Would mass deportation of 11 million undocumented 
immigrants violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches 
and seizures? Would non-citizens be able to exercise their Fifth Amendment 
guarantee of due process? Would a ban on Muslim entry transgress the Equal 
Protection and Due Process clauses? Would a Muslim registry and enhanced 
surveillance of mosques infringe the First and Fifth Amendments? Would revived 
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‘waterboarding’ violate the Fifth and Eighth? A Trump Solicitor General and Justice 
Department would conceivably argue otherwise, while attempts to suppress voter 
registration, weaken the Voting Rights Act, and adopt lax civil rights enforcement 
could advance rapidly. They might also build on the Obama’s administration’s 
aggression - employing the Espionage Act to prosecute leakers and demand phone 
records from Associated Press reporters – to intimidate the press. 
Pro-Trump panegyrics dignify him as the antidote to ‘moralistic conservatives’ 
and possessor of greater legitimacy than the institutions meant to restrain him. Some 
even employ a Straussian distinction between ‘tyranny’ and ‘Caesarism’, wherein a 
tyrant takes absolute power by overthrowing a constitutional republic while a Caesar 
does so only after a republic’s collapse - Caesar Trump as redemptive saviour of 
republican order, reasserting popular sovereignty and natural right (Sanneh, 2017). 
Even on a less hyperbolic, Schumpeterian conception of democracy as a competition 
for power through regular elections, though, Trump could tilt the rules away from 
fairness. The question remains how far such populism in power might succeed. 
 
Illiberal Constitutionalism: Weimar America?  
Although Trump’s constitutional illiteracy and populist disdain for pluralism prompt 
foreboding, there is reason to doubt the republic’s collapse and anticipate his more 
egregious proposals’ obstruction, abandonment or striking down. This is less 
Panglossian than prosaic history: a Constitution that concretises stable deliberation 
and precludes radical change lacking broad support. America’s fractured republic is 
neither inherently frozen nor illiberal and destabilising policy discontinuity is not 
unconstitutional. Critics despairing of a conservative constitutional edifice may not 
experience a change of heart but long-derided features – separation of powers, 
judicial review, hyper-legalism, federalism, hyper-pluralism and constant elections - 
inhibit populist techniques of state colonisation, mass clientelism and repression. 
Each, however, is necessary; none alone is sufficient. 
Even with ‘unified’ party control, presidents possess no blank cheque. Simply 
managing intra-executive branch conflict and expending limited political capital 
judiciously represent all-consuming tasks, even for gifted, disciplined and 
emotionally intelligent presidents. The separation of powers makes the system highly 
resistant to change lacking broad support, ensuring institutional interests collide as 
much as coalesce, not only between executive and legislature but House and Senate. 
Trump won no mandate, lacks large legislative majorities, and faces a highly-
polarised, distrustful public. Securing major policy change (1933, 1965 and 1981) in 
these conditions is formidably difficult. While instruments of executive power are 
extensive, they remain modest compared to the transformative requirement of 
Congress enacting legislation, itself complicated by Republican fissures, a narrow 52-
48 Senate majority, Democratic opposition, and normal electoral cycle dynamics.  
The Bush (2001, 2003-07) and Obama presidencies (2009-10) demonstrated 
that even with unified control, familiar features – bicameralism and Senate 
supermajorities - make legislative action slow and difficult. ‘The Senate has a rich, 
bipartisan tradition of being a constitutional check on presidents of both parties … 
That sacred constitutional duty of holding the president accountable to the law must 
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continue,’ Senate Minority Leader, Chuck Schumer (D-NY) declared (Kane, 2017). 
Determined opposition hinders legislative majorities, though Democratic initiatives 
– ending the filibuster for administrative and judicial positions lower than the 
Supreme Court in 2014 and using ‘budget reconciliation’ procedures to pass the 
Affordable Care Act (2010) with a filibuster free 51 votes – assisted Republicans to 
advance the most ambitious conservative policy agenda since the 1920s. Moreover, 
laws allowing votes to disapprove or block executive regulations (the 1996 
Congressional Review Act, Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act 
2017) offer harbingers of congressional reassertion. 
The coalition of convenience between a populist president and conservative 
Congress is also an unfamiliar model occupying a twilight zone between unified and 
divided government. Trump is no unifying Reagan and, insofar as his agenda extends 
beyond ‘winning’, does not share the same one as Republicans. Almost two-thirds of 
House Republicans – experienced in reflexive opposition, not responsible governing 
- never previously served with a Republican president. The threat of being 
‘primaried’ looms but residual anti-Trumpism remains well represented. How far 
Trump reshapes conservatism when he confronts substantive choices between, for 
instance, budget and defence hawks, remains questionable. Similarly, the ‘deep state’ 
is a resource but potentially powerful source of opposition and a president acting 
against the national interest would forfeit limited reservoirs of goodwill. Trump 
aroused suspicion among military and intelligence communities in claiming he 
would order illegal activities, deriding their capabilities, and advancing a Russian 
rapprochement to which both expressed clear opposition. Central though its civilian 
control is to the Constitution, the military – retaining rare public trust – is one 
institution Trump should especially avoid antagonising. 
Executive actions and legislation also remain subject to review and the 
meaning of constitutional law upon an independent judiciary. Historically, the 
Supreme Court has been an unreliable protector of minorities and acted as much to 
enforce as challenge dominant political coalitions. Alarm about Trump appointees 
completing a conservative ‘revolution Jacobin in its disdain for tradition and 
precedent’ by Justices who ‘follow Fox News’ reflects and reinforces judicial 
politicisation (Dworkin, 2007). Appointing the unfilled Scalia seat and probably 
replacing at least one of the liberal/moderate Stephen Breyer (78), Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg (83) and Anthony Kennedy (80), Trump will also inherit some 103 federal 
circuit and district court vacancies (Obama faced 54 in 2009). The least 
constitutionally minded president reshaping constitutional law for a generation 
would constitute a poignant irony. 
But if Trump wishes to reshape the Court, it will take several years. 
Appointments remain subject to filibuster (currently), hence Democrats can veto 
unacceptable nominees. Moreover, while the Court hears about 75 cases annually, 
tens of thousands are decided at the 13 circuit courts, where nine have a majority of 
Democratic-nominated judges (compared to one in 2009). Senate leaders 
traditionally consider circuit and district nominees only if supported by both 
senators representing their state, and 28 states are represented by at least one 
Democrat. Judicial independence also remains a reliable thorn in presidential sides. 
On healthcare and marriage equality, Chief Justice John Roberts disappointed his 
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conservative peers to join the ‘liberal’ quartet. Dworkin’s ‘revolution’ has been 
reformist: 
… most of the landmark Warren Court decisions, in areas such as criminal 
procedure, legislative apportionment, freedom of speech and religion, racial 
discrimination, prisoner rights, substantive due process, and constitutional 
rights, and the Warrenesque decisions of the Burger Court, such as Roe v. 
Wade, have remained largely or entirely intact, even though most would have 
been decided differently by the present Court had they been given to it to 
decide. The expansion of rights brought about by the Warren Court, and to a 
more limited extent by the Burger Court, has ceased; retrenchment is in the 
air. But there is no indication of a wholesale rejection of precedents that most 
of the current Justices may wish had never been created (Posner, 2008, pp. 
55-6).  
In addition, courts have proven willing to enter thickets – such as war powers –once 
deemed ‘political’ matters reserved to elected branches. It is doubtful that Justices 
who proved unpliant to Bush will bend to Trump. The ‘rule of four’ also means that 
direct legal challenges to Trump can gain a hearing. 
That prospect may prove more than abstract. If one comparative advantage of 
democracy is ensuring governmental stability and constraining rulers’ proclivities to 
enrich themselves to public detriment, the republic confronts a chronic ethics test. 
The Emoluments Clause of Article I, Section 9 prohibits any person ‘holding any 
Office of Profit or Trust’ from accepting ‘any present, Emolument, Office, or title, of 
any kind whatsoever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.’ Until and unless the 
details of what Trump owns, owes, and his creditors’ identities is transparent, the 
extensive scope of his business interests poses on-going dilemmas about violating the 
prohibition while his targeting specific individuals and companies for censure raises 
issues of basic probity. Even if the White House is not for sale, tailoring policies to 
private interests suggests its availability for rent, providing sonorous echoes of a 
prior incumbent. As Bill Clinton discovered, however, the president can be sued in 
office by private individuals or impeached for ‘treason, bribery or other high crimes 
and misdemeanours.’ 
As this suggests, fundamental rights and liberties have become sufficiently 
institutionalised that their reversal through discriminatory legalism, though possible, 
is extraordinarily difficult in a hyper-litigious republic. Judges’ narrow or expansive 
readings of clauses, and relative deference to elected branches, shape outcomes, but 
reversing constitutional precedent is rare. It is therefore conceivable, for example, 
that Roe v Wade could be overturned after two or more new Supreme Court 
appointees but inconceivable that a nationwide ban on abortion could be enacted by 
the Court or Congress. While the former would return regulation to the states in a 
victory for restrictive forces, it would not achieve the results sought by the most 
zealous opponents of reproductive rights. Similarly, while Trump described marriage 
equality as settled law, his endorsement of the First Amendment Defence Act – 
prohibiting federal agencies from punishing individuals who discriminate against 
LGBT people on religious grounds – would invite strict scrutiny by the judiciary. 
Unless the Republicans secure improbable supermajorities in Congress, legislation, 
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nominations and constitutional amendments remain subject to Democratic 
opposition. The Bill of Rights is not unsafe.  
Federalism provides additional safeguards preserving extensive power for 
states and cities, whose interests frequently collide with Washington. Admittedly, 
nationalised elections and increased party voting have yielded a plurality of unified 
Republican state governments. Republicans control 32 of 50 governorships, 68 of 98 
state legislative chambers, 33 state legislatures, 4,171 of 7,383 state legislative seats, 
and all state government — legislature and governor — in 24 states (Democrats have 
12); all historic highs. But pragmatic Republican governors such as John Kasich 
(Ohio) have generally been less doctrinaire than their congressional counterparts. 
Moreover, ‘blue’ states such as California, and numerous metropolitan locales, still 
vindicate the ‘laboratories of democracy’ model, developing policy alternatives and 
resistance to the nation’s capital, and precluding state colonisation and mass 
clientelism.  
Systematic repression also confronts a vibrant hyper-pluralism in the mass 
media, interest groups and civil society. A digital age of instantaneous information 
flows, routinised fake news, and silos reinforcing confirmation bias assists a 
presidency that treats as accurate only sympathetic coverage. Trump is also an expert 
news manipulator. Press freedom faces a president who persistently targets the 
media, intimidates journalists, and prefers Tweets and rallies to press conferences to 
communicate. Nonetheless, the fragmentation that assisted Trump’s rise limits his 
reach. If a more centralised media ownership environment existed – or had Trump 
been shrewder in his purchases – a one-sided Berlusconi-style media would prove far 
more Orwellian. Fragmented media make factual politics difficult but centralisation 
guarantees disaster. Moreover, the Trump administration offers a target-rich 
environment for journalism. 20 million Twitter followers is impressive but dwarfed 
by the ranks of Americans disinclined to ‘follow’ Trump’s sturm und drang.  
Tocqueville’s civil society ‘associations’ also remain a cacophonous preserve of 
liberty. On multiple measures, Americans remain inclusive, tolerant and cultural 
pluralism is more resilient than critics concede. From undocumented immigrants to 
LGBT rights, majority opinion is antipathetic to Trump. An irreducible plurality of 
goals and preferences exists within a diverse, morally heterogeneous US whose 
demographics are inexorably departing a monochrome era. From NGOs to 
community groups, multiple forces embracing democratic norms influence agendas, 
attitudes and public policy. In utilising numerous devices of popular accountability to 
resist authoritarian encroachment, the US has no peer in societal fusion of a uniquely 
porous state. For all the attention accorded the presidency as governing focal point, 
the institution remains peripheral to most Americans’ daily existence. 
Finally, there are elections, which have occurred without interruption every 
two years since 1788. Admittedly, in the short-term, this offers limited solace to 
Democrats, one-third of whose House conference represent districts from three 
states: California, New York and Massachusetts. Democrats will need to net 24 seats 
in 2018 to regain the House. The party not holding the White House has gained seats 
in 18 of the past 20 midterm elections – since 1938 - and the out-party has won at 
least 24 seats eleven times. In 2018, however, there will be few competitive seats to 
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contest, with fewer than two dozen Republicans representing districts won by Obama 
in 2012. In the Senate, 25 Democrats and just 8 Republicans are up for re-election in 
2018. Of the former, ten are running in states Trump won in 2016. The normal loss 
of midterm seats for a president’s party may be another rule awaiting Trump’s 
revision.  
What all this confirms is that the operationalisation of parchment barriers 
requires an explicitly political interpretation. Machiavelli and Nietzsche cautioned 
that in democracies the many crush the rich, elite few, whom they fear and envy; 
under populist tyranny, a majority of one. ‘Democracy’ appears nowhere in the 
Constitution, mirrored by the Constitutions absence from Trump’s inaugural 
address. Posner (2003, p. 154) argues the Preamble’s ‘We, the People’ was more an 
assertion of adoption by democratic choice than a claim it established a democracy, 
which ‘is better described as elite democracy than as either deliberative or populist 
democracy.’ The public’s principals are not drawn randomly but are more wealthy, 
educated, and ambitious: ‘The members of the US Senate, regardless of party, have 
more in common with each other than with the majority of their constituents’ 
(Posner, 2003, p. 154). Trump’s Cabinet shares even less. But the US now represents 
an epistocratic republic. Trump’s paradox is that, while not an obvious exponent of 
epistemic humility, his unprecedentedly wealthy administration aspires to a Socratic 
notion of appointing ‘the best people’ while embracing kakistocracy (government by 
the least qualified). Contra Trump, the perennial question invariably humbling 
populists is not whether, but which, elites govern. The irony for those diagnosing ‘we, 
the people’ as ‘we, the problem’ – elected officials overly responsive to poorly 
informed mass opinion – is that their solution of greater discretion for political elites 
comports with Trump’s kakistocratic establishment. Following Pareto, it is not the 
people, but a new Trumpian elite, that circulates Washington’s corridors of power.  
 
Conclusion: My country, ’tis of me 
Channelling Rousseau, Trump declared, ‘The script is not yet written … (but) the 
page will be authored by each and every one of you. You, the incredible American 
people, will be in charge’ (Rucker, 2016). To understate, that requires a willing 
suspension of disbelief difficult to reconcile with the stirring call to a more perfect 
union concluding his campaign book: ‘I don’t just want to bring golfers to America’ 
(Trump, 2015, p. 169).  
A deflationary interpretation confirms Trump as an unpopular populist but - 
despite its conceptual utility - rejects populism as too reductive a mode for 
understanding his ascension, convictions or challenge. Trump confirms populism’s 
plasticity and the essentially political character of liberal constitutional order. 
Trump’s alchemy exploited popular discontent but his polarising triadic populism 
divides more than unites as campaigning device and governing strategy. Although 
media frenzies reinforce the artifice of his authenticity through regular reproduction 
of his rhetoric, a dispassionate constitutional sociology suggests that Trumpism’s 
darker aspects can be obstructed and overcome.  
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The US order is uncongenial to decisive action and any Trump threat bears no 
comparison to slavery, segregation, Japanese internment and multiple denials of 
formally enshrined protections. Trump exercises power because the system enables 
minority rule but presidents habitually discover that Washington is more apt to 
diminish them than the opposite. The very appeals that attracted support combine 
with complex governing exigencies to reduce the erstwhile change agent into a rather 
smaller than life figure, relying on PR to persuade citizens and Heads of State that 
muddle represents calculated ambiguity. At worst, liberalism can temper the 
excesses. At best, through inducing accommodation or defeat, its normative bedrock 
can confirm the inarticulacy of Trump’s voice. Populism requires polarisation to 
thrive, but since getting ‘results’ is easier than ‘fixing’ Washington – alone or 
otherwise – hyper-polarised politics remains a safe bet to outlast its populist cousin. 
The same forces that overcame more capable Chief Executives’ ambitions are 
unlikely to yield to the Donald. 
Populists in office typically continue conducting themselves as victims rather 
than victors, polarising opinion, treating governing as a permanent campaign and 
politics as a perpetual state of crisis and constant siege. Trump is unlikely to be 
troubled by metrics measuring whether working class lives improve - not least since 
symbolic actions frequently assume greater significance than results – while 
scapegoating minorities and ‘elites’ for policy failures. Reconciling his outer Ann 
Coulter and inner Ayn Rand poses a harder challenge. For Trump to tack too closely 
to conservative orthodoxy and a redistributive politics benefitting the wealthy would 
feed the distrust that catalysed his rise. But for Republicans to embrace Trumpism 
would require their donors, intellectuals and activists not to modify but reject 
conservatism. U-turns and Faustian bargains are the warp and woof of politics but 
such syncretism would resemble transgressive identity politics of a different order 
entirely. 
The Constitution remains more than a noble piece of paper, and US 
democracy more mature and liberal than President Trump. Despite presidential 
unilateralism, inhospitable conditions for authoritarian rule exist. Liberal values 
remain deeply embedded and enshrined in law and institutions. Rights are 
institutionalized. Congress jealously guards its prerogatives when seriously 
threatened and can impose order upon even unpredictable presidents, on domestic 
matters if not statecraft. The regulatory state’s bureaucratic behemoth empowers and 
impedes executive action while path dependency in the political economy and 
constitutional law inhibits choice through countless accumulated regulations, 
decisions and precedents.  
In Federalist 22, Hamilton wrote that, ‘The fundamental maxim of republican 
government … requires that the sense of the majority should prevail.’ But Trump 
represents no popular majority and the Constitution hedged against majoritarianism 
by institutionalising Madison’s conviction that ‘ambition must counter ambition.’ In 
Trump’s monetised ambition, the design for ordered liberty is tested anew. Future 
histories might record Trump’s populist presidency as the destabilising inflection 
point in US democracy’s decline and deconsolidation. But they may more plausibly 
detail once more ‘one of the great unexplained phenomena of modern astronomy: 
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namely that the dark night of fascism is always descending in America and yet lands 
only in Europe’ (Wolfe, 1993, pp. 302-3).  
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